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SAVE YOUR BREATH: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
OF THE CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR REFUSING
BREATHALYZER TESTS IN THE WAKE OF
BIRCHFIELD V. NORTH DAKOTA
Kylie Fisher
Abstract: Statutes that criminally penalize suspected drunk drivers who refuse to submit
to testing of their blood alcohol concentration emerged in a number of states as a way to
better enforce implied consent statutes that require drivers submit to such testing. In
Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court held that statutes that criminally punish
individuals for refusing a blood test were unconstitutional but upheld criminal refusal statutes
regarding breath tests. Much of the reasoning in the majority’s opinion stemmed from a
shallow perception of the invasion that breath tests pose to individual privacy interests.
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion noted that where search warrants are reasonably
available, a state’s governmental interest in collecting evidence and promoting safety is
lower than the individual privacy interests at stake. This Comment is about post-Birchfield
strategies for challenging statutes that criminalize refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test.
This Comment approaches the issue from a novel, bottom-up approach that argues
individuals will be most successful in challenging criminal refusal statutes in state courts
under a substantive due process framework that implicates state constitutional rights. This
Comment also sheds light on the underreported and significant issue of criminally punishing
individuals whose language barriers or hearing impairments prevent them from fully
understanding the consequences of refusing a breath test. While drunk driving is undoubtedly
a severe problem that requires regulation, the goal should be to preserve fundamental liberty
interests with viable legal and policy alternatives that can effectively curb drunk driving
rates.
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INTRODUCTION
Drive sober or get pulled over.1 Over the years, drunk drivers have
taken countless lives,2 leading states and the federal government to seek
out harsher or, at the very least, more thorough regulations in an effort to
deter intoxicated individuals from getting behind the wheel.3 States have
a “paramount interest . . . in preserving the safety . . . of public
highways.”4 As a result, the government’s interest in public road safety
has justified a number of exceptions to otherwise foundational
constitutional rights in criminal procedure. For example, highway
sobriety checkpoint programs aimed at reducing the immediate hazard
posed by drunk drivers qualify as a special needs search exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.5 Hit-and-run statutes
requiring drivers involved in a car accident to remain at the scene do not
violate the Fifth Amendment’s core privilege against self-incrimination,
in part because the purpose of such statutes is “not intended to facilitate
criminal convictions, but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities.”6
Similarly, in an effort to decrease drunk driving, some states have
passed statutes that criminally punish those who refuse to submit to a
blood or breath test.7 In Birchfield v. North Dakota,8 the Supreme Court
confined the scope of permissible warrantless tests on suspected drunk
drivers by holding that breath tests, but not blood tests, may be
*J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. Thank you to Professor
Mary D. Fan for inspiring this piece through her fascinating law lectures and for providing such
insightful feedback. Additionally, thank you to the Washington Law Review editorial staff for their
support and suggestions.
1. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY MARKETING, DRIVE SOBER OR GET PULLED OVER
CAMPAIGN, https://www.trafficsafetymarketing.gov/get-materials/drunk-driving/drive-sober-or-getpulled-over [https://perma.cc/G4PQ-QPYT].
2. In 2017 alone, it is estimated that 10,874 fatalities in motor vehicle traffic crashes involved
drivers with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 g/dL or higher. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2017, DOT HS 812 630 (2018),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812630 [https://perma.cc/2Z4Y-TB7P].
3. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 316.193(4)(b)(1) (2019) (stating that any person convicted of drunk
driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.15+ shall be punished by not more than nine months for a
first conviction); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 32-23-2 (2008) (stating that an individual is convicted of
drunk driving for the first time a court may, in its discretion, issue an order requiring 24/7 sobriety
testing and attendance at counseling programs).
4. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (noting the paramount interest the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts has in preserving highway safety).
5. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
6. See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
7. See e.g., N.D. CENT CODE § 39-08-01(2) (2019); ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(f) (2019).
8. 579 U.S. __ , 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
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administered pursuant to a lawful arrest.9 While the majority found
warrantless blood tests to be unconstitutional based on their inherent
invasion of privacy, it created a categorical exception to the warrant
requirement for breath tests incident to arrest based on the negligible
intrusion of the breathalyzer,10 the lack of information a breath test
reveals about the suspected driver,11 and the low likelihood of resulting
embarrassment.12
In an effort to increase voluntary submission to blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) tests, every state has passed some form of implied
consent statute requiring drivers to submit to a chemical blood, breath,
or urine test if they are suspected of driving under the influence.13
Currently, thirteen states have enacted some form of criminal sanction
for drivers who refuse to consent to a breathalyzer test,14 hereinafter
referred as “criminal refusal statutes.” For example, in North Dakota, a
driver who refuses to submit to a blood, breath, or urine test to determine
their alcohol concentration “is guilty of an offense.”15 Even for first time
offenses, the penalty for a DUI in North Dakota is considered a class B
misdemeanor punishable by up to “thirty days’ imprisonment, a fine of
one thousand five hundred dollars, or both.”16 In Alaska, refusal to
submit to a chemical test is a class A misdemeanor with a minimum
sentence of at least seventy-two hours in jail and fines that increase
depending on the number of prior convictions.17 Other states, such as
Washington, take a subtler approach by initially imposing enhanced civil
penalties—such as revocation of the driver’s license, permit, or privilege
to drive for at least one year—in instances where drivers refuse to
9. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185.
10. Id. at 2176.
11. Id. at 2177.
12. Id.
13. See Anne Teigen, CRIMINAL OR ENHANCED CIVIL PENALTIES FOR IMPLIED CONSENT BREATH
TEST REFUSAL, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/transportation/Criminal_or_Ehanced_Civil_penalties_imp
lied_consent_refusal_27135.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ELP-QXMU].
14. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(f) (2019); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-305(a)–(b) (2015); FLA.
STAT. § 316.1932(b) (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189A.105(2)(a)(1) (West 2015); ME. STAT tit.
29-A, § 2411(5) (2018); MINN. STAT. § 169A.20(2) (2018); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-6,197.03(5)–
(6),(8),(10) (2016); N.D CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(2) (2019); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3804(c)(1)–(3)
(2018); 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 31-27-2.1(b)(2)–(5) (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1202(d)(6)(A)–
(B) (2018); VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-268.3(A)(2) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.61.5055(1)(b)(i)–
(ii); (2)(b)(i)–(ii); 3(b)(i)–(ii) (2019).
15. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(2) (2019).
16. Id. § 39-08-01(3); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-01(6) (2019).
17. ALASKA STAT. §§ 28.35.032(f); (g)(1)(A)–(F) (2019).
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consent to a BAC test.18 However, Washington drivers who refuse testing
and are nevertheless convicted of driving under the influence will face
harsher criminal penalties than an individual who submitted to testing, so
long as the test revealed a blood alcohol concentration under 0.15%.19
This Comment highlights the different constitutional challenges that
have been raised in regard to criminal refusal statutes and ultimately
argues that such penalties should be overturned for violating substantive
due process rights. Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the
Birchfield holding and its departure from previous decisions surrounding
traditional warrant requirements. Part II addresses the general dismissal,
by most courts, of the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination as an obstacle to refusing breathalyzer tests. Part III looks
to the rising due process challenges to criminal refusal statutes in state
courts, and more specifically, to the issues state courts face when language
barriers or hearing impairments prevent suspected drunk drivers from
understanding the criminal consequences of refusing a breath test. Lastly,
Part IV advocates for state courts to invalidate criminal refusal statutes for
violating substantive due process rights as applied to state constitutional
rights to be free from unreasonable searches.
Drunk driving not only threatens public safety, but also economic
well-being. A 2010 study noted the economic cost of alcohol-involved
motor vehicle crashes cost approximately $236 billion in comprehensive
societal costs.20 This Comment seeks to shift focus from strict
punishments that likely do little to curb drunk driving, and, instead, push
for increased access to healthcare to tackle chronic alcohol abuse issues
before drivers ever get behind the wheel.21

18. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308(2)(a), with WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308(2)(c)
(stating that drivers who submit to testing that then reveals a blood alcohol content above the legal
limit only face a license suspension for at least ninety days). Further, a refusal to submit to a
chemical test in Washington “is admissible into evidence at a subsequent criminal trial.” WASH.
REV. CODE § 46.61.517.
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.5055(1)(b)(i)–(ii) (imposing mandatory imprisonment for
anywhere between 200 to 364 days and a fine between $500 to $5,000). Compare to WASH. REV.
CODE § 46.61.5055(1)(a)(i)–(ii) (imposing mandatory imprisonment for anywhere between 100 to
364 days and a fine between $350 to $5,000).
20. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL
IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES 163 (2015), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/
812013 [https://perma.cc/XS2A-6KY5].
21. For a nuanced discussion on a mental health approach to deterring drunk driving, see Mark
Feigl, DWI and the Insanity Defense: A Reasoned Approach, 20 VT. L. REV. 161 (1995).
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AN OVERVIEW OF BIRCHFIELD V. NORTH DAKOTA:
UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES FOR BREATH TESTS
INCIDENT TO ARREST

The Supreme Court has carved out several exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.22 These exceptions include searches
performed incident to arrest. Pre-Birchfield, the search incident to arrest
doctrine was incredibly limited. The Birchfield decision drastically
altered the legal landscape by providing blanket exceptions for breath
tests performed incident to lawful arrest.23 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent
noted the unprecedented logic employed in the majority’s opinion and
criticized the majority’s casual disregard of core constitutional rights.24
Specifically, Justice Sotomayor stressed her fear that the Birchfield
holding would hollow out the once firm search warrant protections
inherent in the Fourth Amendment.25 These fears ultimately proved
reasonable as the Supreme Court just recently relied on the Birchfield
precedent in a tight 5-4 plurality decision that upheld the
constitutionality of warrantless blood draws of unconscious individuals
suspected of drunk driving.26 Thus, in many ways, the Birchfield
decision marks a potentially drastic shift in the interpretation of implied
consent and permissible searches under the Fourth Amendment at the
federal level.
A.

Pre-Birchfield: Search Warrants Required Absent Some Exigency

To protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Fourth Amendment requires a search warrant supported by probable
cause, particularly in cases involving “intrusions into the human body,”
absent some emergency or special need.27 For instance, the warrantless
collection of biological samples from railroad employees is justified
based on the government’s interest in ensuring the safety of railroad
operations.28 Ordinary law enforcement, however, is not subject to a

22. See infra Section I.A.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Birchfield v. North Dakota, _ U.S._, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2195 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
in part).
26. See Mitchell v. Wisconsin, No. 18-6210, 2019 WL 2619471, at *1 (S. Ct. Jun. 27, 2019).
27. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
28. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 (1989).
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special needs exception.29 Additionally, the “natural metabolization of
alcohol in the bloodstream” does not present a per se exigency that
justifies a categorical exception to the search warrant requirement.30
Rather, the alleged exigency should be determined on a case by case
basis under the “totality of the circumstances.”31 In the cases pre-dating
Birchfield, the Supreme Court had a fairly clear grasp on the need to
limit exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement based,
primarily, upon the rationale that warrants are not “an inconvenience to
be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.”32
B.

Searches Incident to Arrest: Confining the Warrant Requirement’s
Greatest Loophole

The concept of the search incident to arrest doctrine had not been
widely developed in Supreme Court jurisprudence until the latter stages
of Prohibition.33 Then, in 1969, the Court began attempting to define the
limits of permissible searches incident to lawful arrest.34 In Chimel v.
California, the Court held that, following a lawful arrest, an officer
could reasonably search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons or to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence.35 The
touchstone of the Chimel Court’s holding included a reasonableness
requirement in order to embody the safeguards afforded by the Fourth
Amendment “against the evils to which it was a response.”36
In recent years, Supreme Court decisions, such as Riley v.
California,37 began to recognize that rapid advancement in technology
led to a further need to define reasonable searches incident to arrest
“[a]bsent more precise guidance from the founding era.”38 Thus, modern
29. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (holding that a checkpoint
program whose primary purpose was to discover and interdict illegal drugs did not qualify as a
special needs exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment).
30. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013).
31. Id.
32. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 481 (1971)).
33. Charles E. MacLean, But, Your Honor, A Cell Phone is not a Cigarette Pack: An Immodest
Call for a Return to the Chimel Justifications for Cell Phone Memory Searches Incident to Lawful
Arrest, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 41, 49 (2012).
34. Chimel v. California, 359 U.S. 752 (1969).
35. Id. at 763.
36. Id. at 765 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter J.,
dissenting)).
37. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
38. Id. at 385.
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courts typically weigh the degree of the intrusion upon an individual’s
privacy against the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.39 In
Riley, the Supreme Court refused to categorically extend the search
incident to arrest doctrine to digital data stored on phones because: (1) cell
phone data did not pose a physical threat to officer safety; and (2) concerns
of evidence destruction were remote and could be prevented.40 Furthermore,
the Court observed that, “[t]he fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy
interests does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture
entirely.”41 By recognizing the gamesmanship utilized by police officers
who conduct searches incident to arrest, the Supreme Court precedent preBirchfield recognized certain situations where privacy interests prevail over
police interest in obtaining as much evidence as possible without the burden
of first obtaining a valid search warrant.
C.

The Birchfield Majority: Lack of Privacy Concerns for Breath
Tests Justifies a Categorical Exception to Warrant Requirements
Under the Fourth Amendment

Birchfield was decided in conjunction with two other cases
concerning suspected drunk drivers who were forced to either consent to
a blood or breath test or risk facing criminal charges.42 Petitioner Danny
Birchfield accidentally drove his car off a highway in North Dakota in
October 2013.43 Upon arrival at the scene, a state trooper observed
Birchfield’s eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he smelled
strongly of alcohol.44 After Birchfield failed several field sobriety tests,
the state trooper informed Birchfield of his obligation under North
Dakota’s implied consent statute to submit to a BAC test and
subsequently arrested him when the results of his breath test exceeded
the legal limit of 0.08 percent.45 Once Birchfield was taken to the police
station, he refused to let his blood be drawn for more accurate BAC
testing and ultimately pled guilty to a misdemeanor violation of refusing

39. Id. (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1990)).
40. Id. at 373.
41. Id. at 392.
42. The other two cases before the Birchfield Court were Beylund v. Levi and Bernard v.
Minnesota. The former case also concerned North Dakota’s criminal refusal statute and the latter
case dealt with Minnesota’s criminal refusal statute. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, _ U.S._, 136 S.
Ct. 2160, 2162–63 (2016).
43. Id. at 2170.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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the blood test under North Dakota’s criminal refusal statute.46 His guilty
plea was conditional on his argument that “the Fourth Amendment
prohibited criminalizing his refusal to submit to [a blood] test.”47 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether arrested drunk drivers
may be penalized for refusing to submit to a warrantless BAC test.48
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito held that the Fourth
Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to arrest, but not
warrantless blood tests.49 Despite longstanding case law that confined
the ability of the government to sidestep traditional warrant
requirements, the Birchfield Court elected to create a blanket exception
for breathalyzer tests incident to arrest due, primarily, to the diminished
privacy interests associated with breath tests.50 The basis for this ruling
stemmed largely from a formalist view of searches incident to lawful
arrest as an “ancient pedigree”51 that was “always recognized under
English and American law, to search the person of the accused when
legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime.”52
The majority likened the invasion of an individual’s mouth during a
breath test to “blowing up a party balloon.”53 Additionally, the majority
concluded that the results of a BAC test reveal very little information as
opposed to warrantless DNA swabs that were upheld for identification
purposes during booking procedures.54 Finally, the majority concluded
that participation in a breath test does not subject an individual to a great
deal of embarrassment.55 The majority perceived breath tests as a
justifiable procedure to be performed as a search incident to lawful arrest
and discredited the intrusion into a human orifice as a substantial
invasion of privacy because humans voluntarily place straws in their
mouths when drinking beverages.56 Thus, the majority relied on
analogies that treated breath tests as casual and simple procedures rather
than focus on the weakened dignity that results from requiring an individual

46. Id. at 2170–71.
47. Id. at 2171.
48. Id. at 2172.
49. Id. at 2184.
50. Id. at 2176–77.
51. Id. at 2174.
52. Id. at 2175 (quoting Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
53. Id. at 2177.
54. Id. (citing Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66, 1980 (2013)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
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to “blow continuously for 4-15 seconds into a straw-like mouthpiece.”57
The underlying rule justifying searches incident to arrest is based on a
need to prevent an arrestee from grabbing a weapon or destroying
evidence.58 By upholding warrantless breath tests and the state statutes
criminalizing refusal to such tests, the majority disregarded the totality
of the circumstances approach established in McNeely59 and, instead,
created an entirely new justification to searches incident to arrest—the
preservation of evidence related to BAC tests.60 While closing the door
on warrantless blood tests, the majority created a massive loophole to
core constitutional privacy rights by upholding warrantless breath tests
incident to arrest based on unprecedented justifications. This approach
has been perceived by some legal scholars as essentially “splitting the
baby” in a manner that creates more questions than answers in regard to
permissible warrantless searches.61
D.

Justice Sotomayor’s Partial Dissent: A Defense of Warrant
Requirements as a Necessary Means to Carrying Out the Fourth
Amendment’s Promise

Citing the “touchstone of reasonableness” at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment, Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Birchfield argued that
neither warrantless blood or breath tests should be categorically
permitted as a search incident to arrest.62 First, Justice Sotomayor noted
that a police officer is not enabled to conduct pat-downs, cheek swabs,
or blood and breath BAC tests simply because they have made an
arrest.63 Instead, Supreme Court precedent requires “[e]ach search[] be
separately analyzed to determine its reasonableness.”64 In highlighting
the touchstone of reasonableness, the dissent recognized that
reasonableness typically requires officers secure search warrants unless
one of a few specific and well established exceptions applies.65 Among

57. Id. at 2176 (citing Brief for Respondent in No. 14-1470, p. 20).
58. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 (1969).
59. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 145 (2013).
60. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2182.
61. Steven Oberman, Blood or Breath in Birchfield: The Supreme Court Draws a Critical
Distinction, 40 CHAMPION 47, 49 (2016).
62. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Brigham City v.
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2188.
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these exceptions are case-by-case exigent circumstances66 and
categorical exceptions, such as searches incident to arrest to either (1)
disarm an arrestee who might endanger officer safety, or (2) prevent the
destruction of evidence.67 The dissent then pondered whether, in light of
individual privacy interests, a legitimate governmental interest justifies
warrantless breath searches under either a case-by-case exception or
categorical exception and, ultimately, concluded it does not.68
The dissent raised four issues with the legitimate governmental
interest in combatting drunk driving. First, the government’s interest in
protecting the public from drunk drivers is essentially resolved once a
suspected drunk driver is taken into custody and no longer poses a threat
to other drivers.69 Second, the government’s interest in preventing the
destruction of evidence (i.e., the dissipation of alcohol in the blood
stream) is minimal considering standard breath tests are usually
conducted long after an arrest due to a number of factors, including the
need to prevent residual mouth alcohol from inflating test results.70
Next, the dissent argued the government’s interest in minimizing the
cost of gathering evidence is not particularly strong, given that the
burden of issuing search warrants would only require judges to issue
“fewer than one extra warrant a week,” even if refusal rates in North
Dakota and Minnesota doubled.71 Lastly, the dissent dismissed the
government’s interest in the convenient collection of evidence, noting,
“[t]his Court has never said that mere convenience in gathering evidence
justifies an exception to the warrant requirement.”72
By expanding on already well-grounded exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the dissent feared that the holding in Birchfield would risk
hollowing out the value of the Fourth Amendment to the point where it
becomes an “empty promise.”73 While breath tests may not constitute a
substantial invasion of privacy, the dissent made the simple but effective
point that the Court fails to protect individual rights “if exaggerated time
pressures, mere convenience in collecting evidence, and the
‘burden’ . . . of issu[ing] an extra couple of warrants per month are costs

66. See supra Section I.A.
67. See supra Section I.B.
68. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2191 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting in part).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2192.
71. Id. at 2193–94.
72. Id. at 2194.
73. Id. at 2195.
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so high as to render reasonable a search without a warrant.”74
E.

Post-Birchfield: Emergencies and Exigency Justify Sidestepping
Warrant Requirements

In June 2019, the Supreme Court “returned to the topic . . . addressed
twice in recent years: the circumstances under which a police officer
may administer a warrantless [BAC] test” to a suspected drunk driver.75
That case, Mitchell v. Wisconsin, drew on the foundation laid in
Birchfield to ultimately uphold the involuntary and warrantless blood
draw of an unconscious individual suspected of drunk driving based on
the exigency posed by (1) dissipating BAC evidence, and (2) some other
factor creating a “pressing health, safety, or law enforcement need[]”
that takes priority over warrant requirements.76 In Mitchell, the plurality
noted that an unconscious individual undoubtedly constitutes a medical
emergency and would likely result in a blood draw for diagnostic
purposes anyway.77 Thus, in situations where a suspected drunk driver’s
unconsciousness or stupor prevents police from securing a breath test,
the police “may almost always order a warrantless blood test” of the
suspect without offending the Fourth Amendment.78
Writing again in a dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor criticized the
plurality opinion’s “brand new presumption of exigent circumstances . . .
that contravenes this Court’s precedent.”79 In particular, the dissent took
issue with the plurality’s disregard of McNeely, a case that explicitly
held the dissipation of blood alcohol in the bloodstream would not, on its
own, constitute a per se exigency.80 While unconscious drivers do
present additional health concerns, such concerns should not
automatically confer exigency, particularly because police likely have
even more time to secure a warrant for an unconscious individual due to
the need to arrange transportation to a hospital.81 Where the plurality
saw its opinion as “helping to ameliorate the scourge of drunk driving,”
the dissent saw another “needless blow at the protections guaranteed by

74. Id.
75. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, No. 18-6210, 2019 WL 2619471, at *2 (S. Ct. June 27, 2019).
76. Id. at *7.
77. Id. at *1.
78. Id. at *9.
79. Id. at *11 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
80. See supra, Part I.A.
81. Mitchell, 2019 WL 2619471 at *17 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
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the Fourth Amendment.”82 The stark divide among the Supreme Court in
Birchfield and later in Mitchell strongly suggests that the fight for firmer
individual privacy protections may be more easily won at the state court
level.
II.

THE GENERAL VIEW THAT CRIMINALIZING REFUSAL OF
BREATH TESTS DOES NOT COMPEL TESTIMONY SO AS
TO VIOLATE THE FIFTH AMENDMENT

The Birchfield Court disregarded the privacy interests in breathalyzer
tests under the Fourth Amendment,83 but left unanswered whether the
criminal sanctions for refusing such tests violates the Fifth
Amendment’s core privilege against self-incrimination. The FifthAmendment requires that no person shall be “compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself.”84 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
observed that the “[p]rohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court
to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material.”85 The doctrinal
structure of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
relies on three main elements: compulsion, incrimination, and
testimony.86 Even if an act may provide incriminating evidence, a
suspect may still be compelled to perform that act in cases where it is not
deemed testimonial.87
Both the Supreme Court and lower court decisions provide helpful
insights into how the elements of compulsion, incrimination, and
testimony are applied to criminal refusal statutes. Federal courts are
typically unwilling to recognize criminal refusal statutes as a form of
compulsion because drivers are still presented with a choice.88 Even
though blood tests are potentially incriminating, the Supreme Court has
held that they are a physical act and, therefore, not testimonial.89 The

82. Id. at *19.
83. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S._, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
84. U.S. CONST. amend V.
85. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 (1910).
86. Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future
Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 246 (2004).
87. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 35 (2000) (citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245,
252–53 (1910) (putting on a t-shirt, for example, is not a testimonial act)).
88. Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
89. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 765 (1966).
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Supreme Court also dismissed similar arguments regarding the privilege
against self-incrimination where a suspect was required to wear
particular clothing in a lineup90 or supply a handwriting sample.91 Thus,
a Fifth Amendment challenge to breath tests seems circumstantial at best
given the Court’s treatment of acts that “depend on chemical analysis
and on that alone.”92
A.

Criminal Penalties for Refusing a Breathalyzer Are a Matter of
Choice

The Supreme Court has held that evidence of a defendant’s refusal to
submit to a BAC test does not violate their privilege against selfincrimination because the defendant is not initially compelled to comply
and has the option to refuse.93 Even if refusal to comply with a test may
lead to criminal sanctions, such as a misdemeanor, the Ninth Circuit has
ruled that such penalties are justified based on a need for compliance and
are not compulsive.94 The Ninth Circuit has further reasoned that a
choice with criminal consequences is “no more impermissibly coercive
than any order to produce physical evidence which is backed with the
sanction of criminal contempt.”95
Implied consent statutes and their subsequent sanctions are considered
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose and do not present
improper conditions.96 Such reasoning is based largely on the premise
that a suspected drunk driver has two choices. First, the driver may
voluntarily submit to the test and gain prompt release and no charges if
the evidence is favorable to them. Alternatively, if the evidence is
unfavorable, the driver may still challenge the government’s use of that
evidence by attacking the validity of the arrest.97 Second, the driver may
refuse to take the test and still attack the validity of the arrest.98 While
suspects may find these options unsatisfactory, courts’ overarching
rationale is that “the criminal process often requires suspects and

90. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1967).
91. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7 (1973).
92. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
93. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983).
94. See Deering v. Brown, 839 F.2d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 1988).
95. Id.
96. See Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986).
97. See id.
98. See id.
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defendants to make difficult choices.”99 Based on this rationale, courts
are generally unwilling to find that implied consent statutes with
criminal penalties compel individuals to submit to a BAC test and, thus,
do not violate the Fifth Amendment.100
B.

Breath Tests, While Potentially Incriminating, Are a Bodily
Function and, Thus, Not Considered Testimonial

The Fifth Amendment protects testimonial evidence that may
potentially be self-incriminating, but does not protect real or physical
evidence.101 In particular, the “communication must itself, explicitly or
implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information.”102 Thus,
there is an overwhelming consensus that bodily functions and acts are
generally not testimonial.103 The act of exhaling into a breathalyzer does
not, by itself, invoke a factual assertion. Rather, information is only
disclosed once the test determines the BAC based on the contents of the
suspect’s breath.104 Because BAC test evidence is not testimonial and
does not relate to some communicative act or writing by the suspect, it is
considered admissible on privilege grounds.105
Even under a more expansive view of what types of things should be
deemed testimonial, breath tests still seem unlikely to qualify.
Dissenting in Doe, Justice Stevens suggested that while an individual
may be “forced to surrender a key to a strongbox containing
incriminating documents” he should not be “compelled to reveal the
combination to his wall safe.”106 Since the act of breathing is involuntary
and does not compel an individual to reveal the contents of his mind, it
is likely more akin to a key in a strongbox than a numerical safe
combination. As a result, breath tests will consistently fail to qualify
under the privilege against self-incrimination based on both the majority
and minority approach in existing case law.

99. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983).
100. See, e.g., id. at 562; Deering v. Brown, 839 F.2d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 1988).
101. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
102. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210 (1988).
103. See, e.g., Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 (holding that blood is not testimonial); Pennsylvania v.
Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 592 (1990) (slurring of speech and evidence of a lack of coordination during a
field sobriety test is not testimonial).
104. See Francis X. Bellotti, The Preparation and Trial of a Drunken Driving Case Involving a
Breathalyzer, 1 NAT’L J. CRIM. DEF. 131, 137–38 (1975).
105. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765.
106. Doe, 487 U.S. at 219 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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III. GRADUAL ACCEPTANCE AT THE STATE LEVEL THAT
CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR REFUSING BREATH TESTS
VIOLATE DUE PROCESS
The constitutionality of criminal refusal statutes is consistently upheld
in both Fourth107 and Fifth108 Amendment contexts. However, continued
acceptance of such laws will likely depend on how courts analyze them
under the substantive due process framework of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Under the incorporation doctrine, the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is enforceable
against states and must be upheld in both federal and state courts.109
Thus, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is an
important safeguard against governmental interference with core
individual rights. Under substantive due process, the government may
not infringe upon “certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests . . . unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”110
At least a couple state courts recognize that while drunk driving
undoubtedly poses a serious hazard, criminal refusal statutes are too
broad to serve compelling state interests in deterring future drunk drivers
or maintaining public safety.111 Furthermore, recent trends suggest state
courts are willing to expand upon federal constitutional rights where
state constitutional rights are stronger. Such trends can prove particularly
imperative for individuals who may not even understand the criminal
penalties they face by exercising their right to refusal, due to hearing
impairments or language barriers. Thus, both implied consent and
criminal refusal statutes are likely best tackled with a due process
litigation strategy, at least at the state level.
A.

Under a Strict Scrutiny Microscope, Criminal Refusal Statutes May
Lack a Compelling Interest Narrowly Tailored to the Protection of
Fundamental Rights

In State v. Ryce,112 the Kansas Supreme Court became the first state to
strike down criminal refusal statutes as a substantive due process

107. See supra Section I.C.
108. See supra Section II.A–B.
109. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–53 (1961).
110. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
111. State v. Ryce, 368 P.3d 342, 378–80 (Kan. 2016); State v. Yong Shik Wong, 372 P.3d 1065,
1081–82 (Haw. 2015).
112. Ryce, 368 P.3d at 342.
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violation.113 In a sprawling forty-two page opinion, the Court reasoned
that criminal punishment of a driver’s withdrawal of consent “infringes
on fundamental rights arising under the Fourth Amendment.”114 The
background and facts in Ryce were quite similar to those in Birchfield,
wherein the petitioner, Ryce, was pulled over for erratic driving and
subjected to field sobriety tests after the officer noticed that Ryce’s eyes
were bloodshot and that he smelled strongly of alcohol.115 Ryce was
arrested and transported to jail where he was informed that refusal to
submit to a breath test would result in suspension of his license and
criminal charges.116 Despite these warnings, Ryce refused to submit to a
breath test.117
Ryce was charged with a nonperson felony118 of refusing to submit to
BAC testing.119 He moved to dismiss the refusal charge, stating that
Kansas’s criminal refusal statute violated his right to be free from
unreasonable searches under both the Fourth Amendment and Section 15
of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.120 Additionally, Ryce argued
the statute violated his right to substantive due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.121 The State of Kansas argued that such
criminal penalties merely punished drivers for obstructing law
enforcement and that Ryce had no constitutional right to refuse to submit
to testing.122
The majority dismissed the State’s argument and held that breath tests
do still receive Fourth Amendment protections despite the reduced
privacy interests for drivers.123 In doing so, the Court noted that implied
consent statutes do not mean that a driver loses their reasonable
expectation of privacy in bodily integrity by merely taking the wheel of
a vehicle after drinking.124 The main obstacle to Ryce’s Fourth

113. Id. at 378–80.
114. Id. at 347.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id
118. Pre-Ryce, the Kansas criminal refusal statute only applied where a DUI suspect previously
refused to submit to testing or had been previously convicted of a DUI offense. Third and
subsequent offenses for refusing to submit to testing under the statute were “classified as nonperson
felonies and a conviction result[ed] in mandatory imprisonment.” Id. at 349.
119. Id. at 347.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 348.
123. Id. at 352.
124. Id.
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Amendment claims was that, though he was seized, the seizure was not
the source of his complaint and his refusal to submit to testing meant he
was not searched either.125 Thus, Ryce’s claims were deemed to rest on
rights “flowing from the Fourth Amendment.”126 Nevertheless, the Ryce
Court ultimately decided Ryce’s claim could be analyzed under a
substantive due process framework because his Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was exercised by
withdrawing his implied consent to take a breath test, thus invoking a
substantive liberty interest in the right of refusal.127
In recognizing a potential due process violation, the Ryce Court held
that the highest level of scrutiny, strict scrutiny, should apply to criminal
refusal statutes as they implicate the fundamental right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.128 To survive strict scrutiny, the
Court noted that Kansas’s criminal refusal statute should be narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.129 While the Ryce Court
recognized the state of Kansas did have compelling interests in serving
criminal justice, encouraging public safety, and protecting officers on
the scene,130 the Court ultimately reasoned the criminal refusal statute
was “impermissibly broad” and the compelling interests could be
achieved through more constitutional means.131
Paramount to the Ryce Court’s holding was the fact that warrants are
“capable of achieving the same goals [of reducing refusal rates and
improving the ability to recover BAC evidence] as those targeted by the
test refusal statute.”132 Furthermore, the Court held that civil penalties
for refusal, such as revocation of the suspect’s driver’s license, are likely
just as successful in satisfying the compelling interest of keeping certain
drivers off the road for a time.133 Thus, the holding by the Ryce Court
closely paralleled Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Birchfield by
advocating for what it considered to be the equally viable alternative of a
search warrant in order to preserve fundamental rights under the Fourth
Amendment.134
125. Id. at 371.
126. Id. (emphasis in original).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 376.
129. Id. at 377.
130. Id. at 378.
131. Id. at 380.
132. Id. at 378.
133. Id. at 379.
134. See supra Section I.D.
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Notably, because the Birchfield decision came down one year after
Ryce, it would likely reverse Ryce on the issue of invalidating criminal
refusal statutes where a breath test is performed incident to arrest.135
Nevertheless, the due process argument still holds weight in overturning
criminal refusal statutes where refusal is made before a lawful arrest has
occurred. Furthermore, the Ryce Court applied a strict scrutiny test to
hold criminal refusal statutes unconstitutional under section 15 of the
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.136 Thus, state courts are not bound by
the Birchfield decision to the extent that their state constitutions
incorporate a right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
So long as Birchfield remains good law, post-arrest warrantless BAC
tests are likely to remain permissible. The Ryce decision is significant
insofar as it provides individuals in state courts with a potential due
process argument to overturn the criminal sanctions surrounding their
refusal to submit to BAC tests on state constitutional grounds.
B.

Recent Trends in State Courts Recognize Their Power to Expand
Pre-Established Rights Under the U.S. Constitution

In the past few decades, courts have held that state constitutional
rights may enhance civil liberties guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution.137
For example, the Supreme Court of Hawai’i interpreted its own
constitutional rights regarding due process and protection from
unreasonable searches to warrant even greater protection than those
guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution during a search incident to
arrest.138 This recognition of greater protection under Hawai’i’s version
of the Fourth Amendment led the Supreme Court of Hawai’i to refuse to
recognize an exception to the warrant requirement (including searches
incident to arrest) absent valid consent in State v. Yong Shik Won.139
Immediately following this decision, the Hawai’i Legislature repealed its
statute criminalizing refusal to submit to a breath test.140
Similar to the decision in Ryce, the holding in Yong Shik Won was
decided prior to the Supreme Court’s holding in Birchfield. Hawai’i’s

135. See Ryce, 368 P.3d at 376.
136. Id. at 380.
137. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986).
138. State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 (Haw. 1974).
139. 372 P.3d 1065 (Haw. 2015) (ruling that the trial court erred by not suppressing the evidence
of defendant’s breath test when valid consent was not given).
140. 2016 Haw. Sess. Laws 21.
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intermediate court of appeals addressed this issue recently in a 2018
case, noting that the Yong Shik Won Court based its holding on an
interpretation of state constitutional protections from unreasonable
searches and seizures and, accordingly, “the Hawai’i Supreme Court is
free to give broader protection under the Hawai’i Constitution than given
by the United States Constitution.”141 Thus, the appellate court held that
individuals have a state constitutional right to refuse to submit to a BAC
test and cannot be criminally convicted for invoking their right to
refuse.142 An essential part of the court’s reasoning was that “[i]t is
manifestly coercive to present a person with a ‘choice’ that requires
surrender of the constitutional right to refuse a search in order to
preserve the right to not be arrested for conduct in compliance with the
constitution.”143 The recent opinions of the Kansas and Hawai’i state
courts recognize the importance of preserving privacy and liberty
interests, leaving the door open for other states to follow suit and protect
the individual liberties of their respective citizens where federal courts
are otherwise unwilling.
C.

The Implications of Failing to Understand the Potential
Consequences of Refusing a Breath Test for Hearing-Impaired and
Non-English-Speaking Individuals

Perhaps one of the harshest realities of implied consent laws occurs
when suspected drunk drivers are unable, because of some sort of
hearing impairment or limited English vocabulary, to fully understand
either the civil or criminal consequences of refusing to submit to a BAC
test. Generally speaking, courts are unsympathetic to the argument that
officers should ensure a driver understands the implied consent notice
for BAC testing.144 In Commonwealth v. Mordan,145 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held, “a deaf motorist is not entitled to a sign language
141. State v. Wilson, 413 P.3d 363, 370 (Haw. Ct. App. 2018) (citing State v. Viglielmo, 95 P.3d
952, 966 (Haw. 2004)), aff’d SCWC-15-0000682, 2019 WL 2537681 (Haw. Jun. 20, 2019).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 367.
144. See, e.g., Furcal-Peguero v. State, 566 S.E.2d 320, 324 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding a
Spanish-speaking defendant arrested for DUI consented to chemical test under implied consent
law); Yokoyama v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 356 N.W.2d 830, 831 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(motorist who spoke Japanese and did not understand English did not have a statutory right to have
the implied consent advisory read to him in Japanese); Martinez v. Peterson, 322 N.W.2d 386, 388
(Neb. 1982) (holding that, for purposes of understanding implied consent, the only understanding
required by a driver is an understanding that he or she has been asked to take a test; failure to
understand the consequences of refusal or to make a reasonable judgment is not a valid defense).
145. 615 A.2d 102 (Pa. Super. 1992).
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interpreter prior to submission to a breathalyzer test so that defendant
can make an informed choice as to whether to take the test.”146 Even
where some courts recognize the need for a certified interpreter to
explain implied consent to hearing-impaired individuals, many courts
still refuse to extend such a requirement to non-native English speakers
under an Equal Protection analysis.147
A minority of states do recognize the injustice of particular
convictions for refusal of implied consent statutes where language
barriers pose an issue.148 Additionally, at least one state court was
willing to find a due process violation where police objectively misled
the defendant regarding the criminal consequence of refusing a breath
test.149 These cases serve as indicators that, even in states where criminal
refusal statutes are upheld, courts may still recognize that individuals are
entitled to at least understand the implications of such laws.
At the federal level, both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibit both implicit and explicit coercion of consent.150 Thus, where a
subject of a search is not in custody and the state seeks a search based on
consent, the state must demonstrate that consent was given voluntarily
and not as a result of duress or coercion.151 While officers may legally
threaten criminal penalties against individuals who refuse to consent to
BAC tests, it seems readily apparent that any consent provided following
such a threat is the result of duress or coercion. This reasoning led the
Supreme Court of Iowa to recognize that “a driver’s consent to testing
may be considered involuntary, and therefore, invalid, if it is coerced or
if the driver is not reasonably informed of the consequences of refusal to
submit to the test.”152 In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned
that the primary purpose of Iowa’s implied consent statute is to advise
accused drivers of the consequences of submitting to or failing the
chemical test,153 thus indicating that officers should make reasonable
146. Id. at 103.
147. Rodriguez v. State, 565 S.E.2d 458, 461 (Ga. 2002) (holding that hearing-impaired persons
and individuals who do not speak English are not similarly situated so state laws requiring
interpreters to assist hearing-impaired persons do not discriminate against non-English-speaking
persons).
148. State v. Marquez, 998 A.2d 421, 433–34 (N.J. 2010) (holding an officer must inform a
driver of the consequences of refusal to submit to a breath test in a language the driver speaks or
understands).
149. Rask v. State, 404 P.3d 1236, 1240 (Alaska Ct. App. 2017).
150. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
151. Id. at 248.
152. State v. Garcia, 756 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 2008).
153. Id. at 222.
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efforts to convey the implied consent warnings to drivers.154
In states such as Nebraska, however, implied consent statutes have
been read to require only that a driver understands they are being asked
to take a test, not the consequences of refusing the test.155 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court of Nebraska was unwilling to adopt a bright-line rule
that would prevent individuals from asserting insufficient English
language skills as a reason for failing to comprehend an officer’s request
that they submit to a chemical test.156 Thus, even in a state such as
Nebraska where the consequences of refusing a breath test need not be
fully comprehended by a suspected drunk driver, the driver’s consent to
chemical testing still requires at least a basic understanding of what
exactly is being requested of them in the first place.157
IV. THE BOTTOM LINE: CRIMINAL REFUSAL STATUTES
VIOLATE CORE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
While the Birchfield decision is unlikely to be reversed any time soon,
individuals who take issue with the criminal refusal statute in their state
should not be dissuaded from seeking relief from state courts.
Specifically, individuals who invoke their state constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable searches may argue that criminal refusal statutes
violate their fundamental rights under a substantive due process
framework. Thus, such arguments should be made based on the unique
reasoning applied in the Ryce decision. An alternative approach may
also exist for individuals to enhance their rights under a state’s implied
consent statute when they lack the hearing or language capabilities to
substantially understand what implied consent even means. Furthermore,
the policy arguments justifying criminal refusal statutes for their
deterrent effect overestimate the impact such sanctions actually have on
refusal rates, especially when considering impulse issues associated with
chronic alcoholics from a public health perspective.
A.

Jumping through Hoops: How States can Embrace the Ryce
Court’s Approach to Avoid the Obstacles Created by the Birchfield
Majority
Though currently thirteen states have some form of criminal sanction

154. Id.
155. Martinez v. Peterson, 322 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Neb. 1982).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 389.

Fisher_Final Online.docx (Do Not Delete)

22

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

11/7/19 7:23 PM

[Vol. 94:1

for refusing to submit to a breath test,158 there are five states—Alaska, 159
Nebraska,160 North Dakota,161 Pennsylvania,162 and Vermont163—whose
statutes closely mirror the penalties declared unconstitutional by the
Ryce Court. Unlike the Supreme Court, the Ryce Court held that breath
tests did constitute a “search” sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendment
protections and that criminal refusal statutes were not narrowly tailored
to allow such a violation of constitutional rights.164 Imperative to this
holding, though, is the fact that the Ryce Court held such statutes to be a
violation of Kansas’s state constitutional rights from unreasonable
searches and seizures.165 Thus, so long as states with existing harsh
criminal refusal statutes recognize a right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, similar challenges can be raised under a strict
scrutiny framework.166
The five states at issue all recognize a right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures in their respective state
constitutions.167 To the extent state courts are willing to embrace their
power to protect individual rights beyond the bare minimum standard set
forth in the Birchfield decision, criminal refusal statutes could easily be
read to violate core state constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Thus, the eradication of criminal refusal statutes
hangs in the balance of the five remaining states who promise the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and, yet, criminally punish their
158. See supra note 14.
159. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 28.35.032(f)–(g), (o) (2012) (establishing that first-time refusal is a
class A misdemeanor requiring at least 3 days imprisonment at a private residence by electronic
monitoring).
160. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-6, 197 (2012); § 60-6,197.03 (2016) (establishing that a
conviction for breath-test refusal constitutes a class W misdemeanor, which requires the driver
apply for an ignition interlock and for a fourth or subsequent offense, at least 180 days of
imprisonment).
161. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (2019) (stating that a first-time refusal constitutes a class
B misdemeanor that includes a $500 fine and mandatory addiction evaluation; where BAC is at least
0.16, the penalty includes a $750 fine and at least two days’ imprisonment).
162. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3804(c)(1) (2018) (stating that a first-time refusal requires at least
three days’ imprisonment, a fine of $1,000–$5,000, and attendance of an alcohol highway safety
school).
163. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(d)(6)(A)–(B) (2017) (establishing that a person may be
charged with a crime for refusal if that person was (a) previously convicted of a DUI or (b) involved
in an accident resulting in serious bodily injury).
164. State v. Ryce, 368 P.3d 342, 380 (Kan. 2016).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 377 (applying strict scrutiny “[b]ecause a fundamental right is involved”).
167. See ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 14; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 8; NEB. CONST. art 1, § 7; PA.
CONST. art. 1, § 8; VT. CONST. Chapter 1, art. 11.
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own citizens when they invoke such a right. Since state courts are free to
interpret the state constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures in a more protective manner, criminal refusal
statutes can be analyzed under the same strict scrutiny standard
employed by the Ryce Court.
To overcome a strict scrutiny test in federal court, the government
interest in violating a constitutional right must be “necessary and
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”168 States
such as Alaska and North Dakota have applied a strict scrutiny test when
a state law would violate a state constitutional right.169 The Ryce Court
held that criminal refusal statutes are not necessary to further the state’s
compelling interest in promoting criminal justice, encouraging public
safety, and protecting officer safety.170 Its reasoning stemmed largely
from the fact that “civil penalties for refusing a test already coerce a
suspect’s cooperation and contemporaneous consent.”171
States with criminal refusal statutes claim that refusal rates for
requested BAC testing will not decrease so long as penalties for failing
the BAC test are less severe than the penalties for refusing the test.172
Notably though, states that impose criminal penalties for refusing BAC
tests, such as North Dakota, Kentucky, and Florida, all saw an increase
in the average mean percentage of refusals occurring between 2005 and
2011.173 In fact, Florida had the most sizeable increase of all fifty states
with a 42% overall increase in mean refusal rate from 2005 to 2011.174
While more research is certainly warranted, it would appear at first
glance that criminal refusal statutes may not significantly influence a
driver’s decision to refuse or consent to a BAC test. Thus, if state courts
in Alaska, North Dakota, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, and Vermont are
willing to recognize that civil penalties such as license revocation can
just as effectively promote state interests in public safety, then they must
168. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 929 (1992) (citing Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
169. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of the Great Nw. v. State, 375 P.3d 1122, 1138 (Alaska 2016)
(applying strict scrutiny test to a law burdening a fundamental right to privacy); In re P.F., 744
N.W.2d 724, 731 (N.D. 2008) (applying strict scrutiny standard to an infringement of a fundamental
right unless it promotes a compelling governmental interest and is necessary to further that interest).
170. State v. Ryce, 368 P.3d 342, 380 (Kan. 2016).
171. Id. at 379–80.
172. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BREATH TEST REFUSAL RATES IN THE UNITED STATES – 2011
UPDATE, 4 (2014), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/breath_test_refusal_rates811881.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Z3Z-C6T7].
173. Id. at 3.
174. Id.
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also recognize that criminal refusal statutes are not narrowly tailored
enough to survive a substantive due process challenge.
B.

Another Avenue to Explore in the Realm of Due Process: Failure
to Understand Criminal Consequences Due to Language or
Hearing Impairments

It is unclear whether or not state courts will be motivated to embrace
the logic employed by the Ryce Court invalidating criminal refusal
statutes on due process grounds. Nevertheless, a further avenue of relief
may still exist for non-native English speakers and hearing-impaired
individuals. Criminal refusal statutes are unreasonable, especially as
applied to individuals unable to understand the concept of implied
consent and the criminal consequences of refusal due to insufficient
English language skills or a hearing impairment.175
North Dakota’s criminal refusal statute “does not apply to an
individual unless the individual has been advised of the consequences of
refusing a chemical test consistent with the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of North Dakota.”176 Thus, certain groups of
people such as non-native English speakers and hearing-impaired
individuals should contend that they were not properly informed by
police officers who do not provide any method of interpretation. Even if
state courts contend that their criminal refusal statutes do not require
drivers to actually understand the ramifications for refusing, as was held
by the Nebraska Supreme Court,177 it can still be argued that a driver
failed to understand an officer’s general request that they submit to
testing. In extreme cases, individuals may even be able to argue that an
officer compelled them to submit to testing, despite their failure to
understand what was being requested of them. Furthermore, individuals
may find success by arguing that criminal refusal statutes are so coercive
as to invalidate any subsequent consent.178 Thus, search warrants would
again serve as the most viable alternative in cases where consent cannot
be given voluntarily.

175. See generally Andrew Dodemaide, Note, No Entiendo: State v. Marquez, Language
Barriers, and Drunk Driving, 9 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 624 (2012).
176. N.D. CENT CODE § 39-08-01(f) (2019) (emphasis added).
177. Martinez v. Peterson, 322 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Neb. 1982).
178. See State v. Wilson, 413 P.3d 363, 370 (Haw. Ct. App. 2018), aff’d SCWC-15-0000682,
2019 WL 2537681 (Haw. June 20, 2019).
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Advocating for Health Services as a More Effective Means of
Curbing Drunk Driving Rates

This Comment does not intend to suggest that legislative efforts to
deter drunk driving should be eliminated. However, if the government’s
goal is to prevent drunk driving, a better solution would seek to tackle
the root of the problem: chronic alcoholism. Drivers with a BAC of 0.08
or higher who are involved in fatal crashes are 4.5 times more likely to
have prior convictions for a DUI than drivers involved in fatal crashes
with no alcohol in their system.179 One major issue with chronic
alcoholics is that they are more likely to take safety risks and act
impulsively.180 Thus, the deterrence-driven methods of criminalizing
refusal to submit to a test before a suspect has even been arrested seems
ill-fitting. While there is still no magical cure to preventing alcohol
abuse, the most successful treatment strategies often involve behavioral
therapy approaches that match the needs of an individual.181 Through
increased access to healthcare, more individuals may begin to combat
their struggle with alcoholism, thus creating a longer-lasting solution to
highway safety.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of Birchfield,182 and, more recently, Mitchell,183 the
Fourth Amendment’s search warrant requirement risks substantial
erosion under the mentality that the needs of the many outweigh the
needs of the few. While such a view may be justified in certain
circumstances, it risks hollowing out core individual rights meant to
guard against significant invasions of privacy and basic dignity. Under a
due process framework, statutes that criminally penalize refusal to
submit to breath tests should be more narrowly tailored to effectively
curb drunk driving without stripping individuals of their liberty interests.
So long as officers are allowed to sidestep warrant requirements and
essentially compel individuals to submit to a breath test to avoid
additional criminal punishments, criminal refusal statutes will continue

179. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DRUNK DRIVING, https://www.nhtsa.gov/risky-driving/drunkdriving#alcohol-abuse-and-cost-5091[https://perma.cc/RDM7-ZQBM].
180. Drugs, Alcohol, and Tobacco: Learning About Addictive Behavior, 1 (Rosalyn CarsonDewitt ed., vol. 1, 2002).
181. Id. at 61.
182. 579 U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
183. No. 18-6210, 2019 WL 2619471 (S. Ct. June 27, 2019).
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“to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who
choose to exercise them.”184 The Constitution demands more in the face
of protecting our most basic rights.

184. State v. Ryce, 368 P.3d 342, 376 (Kan. 2016) (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570, 581–82 (1968)).

